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Several studies have shown the influence of ownership on media content in 
routine contexts, but none has quantitatively tested it in the theoretically important 
context of a crisis. Recently the country musicians, the Dixie Chicks, were 
blacklisted from the radio for criticizing the president in wartime. I use this event 
to test the role of media ownership in a crisis. Through analyzing airplay from a 
national sample of radio stations, this paper finds that contrary to prominent 
allegations grounded in the political economy tradition of media sociology, this 
backlash did not come from owners of large chains. Rather, I find that opposition 
to the Dixie Chicks represents grassroots conservative sentiment, which may be 
exacerbated by the ideological connotations of country music or tempered by 
tolerance for dissent. 
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This paper briefly recounts a history of the Dixie Chicks controversy. I then review 
three relevant literatures with which to understand it: the political economy literature on 
the role of ownership in promoting media hegemony, the political sociology literature on 
the role of social movements and public opinion in shaping the mass media, and the 
sociology of culture perspective on the nature of country music. Each of these literatures 
provides a hypothesis which I then test through regression analysis of a set of radio 
station playlists. 
The controversy has its roots on March 10, 2003, when the Dixie Chicks performed 
at the London nightclub, Shepherd's Bush Empire. On March 12 the British newspaper 
The Guardian published a brief, three-star review of the concert, approvingly noting that 
in a "profoundly punk rock" moment, lead singer Natalie Maines told the audience, "Just 
so you know, we're ashamed the president of the United States is from Texas" (Clarke 
2003). The remark reached American country music fans a few hours later with a post to 
the small website, countrynation.com, which had been following the European press 
coverage of the Dixie Chicks tour. That evening the article was copied in a post entitled 
"Dixie Chick Tea Party--dump Lipton tea for sponsoring anti-American Chicks!" to the 
internet discussion group rec.music.country.western.
1  
On March 13, the day after the Guardian article and internet discussion, the 
Associated Press published the first story in the major American media on the 
controversy, noting that "Angry phone calls flooded Nashville radio station WKDF-FM 
on Thursday, some calling for a boycott of the Texas trio's music" (Associated Press 
2003). After the wire story, several newspapers carried stories on the subject and internet 
discussion bloomed, spreading to alt.fan.dixie-chicks and numerous political discussion 
  1groups. Much of the internet discussion referred to the Dixie Chicks as "sluts" and 
associated them with other anti-war celebrities, as in the insult "hillbilly Jane Fondas." 
Some posters said they agreed with Maines or discussed the nature of dissent and 
rebuttals to it in a democracy at war, but many of the posts expressed contempt for the 
musicians. For instance, one post (inaccurately) alleged that fans at the London concert 
burned an American flag and described the Chicks as "stupid anti-American sluts like 
Jane Fonda, Barbara Streisand, Jeannie Garafalo [sic], Hillary Clinton, etc." Other posts 
took offense at the foreign context of the remark. The internet discussion was a 
microcosm of the discourse about Maines' insult. 
On March 14 the Associated Press reported that radio stations had begun dropping 
the Dixie Chicks from their playlists and engaging in such publicity stunts as providing 
"trash cans outside the radio station for people to throw their Dixie Chicks CDs away" 
(Heidgerd 2003). The week before the controversy began their songs were number one on 
the adult contemporary and country airplay charts as published in the trade journal, Radio 
and Records. During the week during that the story broke, their numbers began to slip on 
the country chart but held steady for adult contemporary. Maines rapidly apologized for 
the disrespectful tone of her remarks, but maintained her right to oppose the war, to no 
avail. Within two weeks they had dropped from both charts entirely. As will be shown 
below, however, the drop was not spread evenly among radio stations, but varied by 
locale, format, and owner in both surprising and predictable ways. 
                                                 
1 The search engine google.com shows no references on the world wide web to the 
incident pre-dating the first Associated Press story. Its usenet archives contain the early 
references described here. In personal communication, Countrynation.com's editor 
confirmed how she discovered the story. 
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"Country Top 50 Indicator" and "AC Top 30"In a New York Times essay that was widely circulated and quoted on the internet and 
alternative print media, Princeton economist Paul Krugman (2003) accused the massive 
radio conglomerate Clear Channel of conspiring against the Dixie Chicks as a favor to the 
Bush administration because, among other reasons, "the Federal Communications 
Commission is considering further deregulation that would allow Clear Channel to 
expand even further, particularly into television." Clear Channel is widely reviled 
because it is the largest radio chain and allegedly abuses its market power. The notion 
that Clear Channel is out to punish the Dixie Chicks for their political statement has 
become a small bit of received wisdom in some circles (e.g. Barrett 2003; Zacharek 
2003). This fits into the familiar frame of the "corporate media" serving to legitimate 
conservative interests (e.g. Bagdikian 2000; McChesney 1999a). 
This paper uses radio airplay data from Radio & Records to determine the source of 
the Dixie Chicks' blacklisting. I assess competing hypotheses of conglomerate media 
ownership and local sentiment.  
 
Theory 
This paper draws on three distinct literatures. I first use the political economy of the 
mass media tradition to predict the role of corporate elites in structuring the content of the 
mass media. I then use the social movements literature to understand the role of public 
opinion and organized masses in dealing with powerful institutions such as the mass 
media. Finally, the sociology of culture explains the symbolism and values of country 
music. Each of the literatures provides a testable hypothesis about the Dixie Chicks 
controversy. To the extent that cultural industry organizations shape cultural discourse, and to the 
extent that cultural discourse shapes our thoughts and actions, these organizations have a 
tremendous amount of power. Both assumptions of this syllogism are disputable, and the 
inquiry is the object of the political economy of the mass media. 
Political economy theorists assume that cultural organizations derive their primary 
interests and political influences from ownership. Herman and McChesney (1997) assert 
that corporate ownership makes the media "missionaries" for global capitalism. Herman 
and Chomsky (1988) describe for-profit ownership as one of "filters" that let the media 
distort reality and promote hegemony. Bagdikian (2000) has argued through six editions 
of his book that "ultra-conservative" managers skew media content. 
There are also some empirical studies. Williams (2002) finds some evidence for 
cross-promotion between the divisions of diversified media conglomerates. Gannett-
owned newspapers have less diverse editorial positions than the aggregate of independent 
papers (Akhavan-Majid et. al. 1991). Studio-owned publications give especially flattering 
movie reviews to their own firm's major releases (Rossman 2002).  
Those quantitative studies that most rigorously isolate the effect of ownership 
typically examine media bias in routine contexts. However, much of the theoretical 
interest in ownership lies in the possibility that the greatest bias will be exhibited when 
class interests are most greatly threatened; during a political crisis of some sort. Even if 
power is not regularly exercised, its potential for use in an extreme situation can 
dramatically restructure the dynamics of a system, as seen by the extreme example of the 
impact of nuclear stockpiles on conventional warfare (Van Creveld 1991). 
  1There are numerous historical studies that establish the role of media ownership in 
extreme circumstances. William Randolph Hearst routinely shaped coverage in his media 
properties to promote both his other financial interests and his political ambitions within 
the Democratic party (Nassaw 2000). Chomsky (1999) describes how the Sulzbergers 
stifled New York Times coverage of the Spanish Civil War. More recently, Rupert 
Murdoch gained favor with the Communist Chinese by canceling a book contract, 
dropping the BBC from his satellite network, and paying an above-market book advance 
to a member of the inner circle (Curtin 2000). There is a notable hole in the literature, 
however, for isolating the systematic, rather than anecdotal, role of ownership in a 
political crisis. 
Political economists have noted a large increase in the concentration of media 
ownership since World War 2 (Bagdikian 2000; McChesney 1999b). Particularly of note 
is the shift of media properties from wealthy families to publicly traded firms, the latter 
often called “the corporate media.” The managerial capitalism of corporations 
theoretically and empirically is distinctive from heroic capitalism in its approach to media 
properties (Tifft and Jones 1999; Bagdikian 2000). 
For decades radio largely escaped the trend of conglomeration thanks to FCC 
regulations that limited firms to owning just a few dozen stations. The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 effectively eliminated ownership restrictions, and 
within a few years the industry reached its current level of conglomeration, with 
Infinity/Viacom, Cumulus, and Citadel owning over one hundred stations each and Clear 
Channel with over one thousand. 
  2Its large size has not made Clear Channel popular with political economists, 
activists, recording artists, record labels, or its radio rivals. The journalist Eric Boehlert is 
particularly critical of Clear Channel. His ongoing series in Salon magazine has accused 
the company of kickbacks for airplay, sexual harassment, and abuse of market power 
(Boehlert 2000-2003). Indeed, Clear Channel is sometimes portrayed as the source of all 
evil, strife, and upheaval in the music industry. It was in this context of academic and 
political discourse about corporate media in general and Clear Channel in particular that 
Krugman (2003) and numerous other commentators accused the company of initiating 
the Dixie Chicks' blacklisting. This provides my first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Large chains, especially the industry leader, Clear Channel, reduced Dixie Chicks 
airplay more than independent stations and small chains. 
 
However, it is useful to appreciate how songs are actually chosen for radio airplay, 
as several trade publications and production of culture studies explain. Most commercial 
radio stations do not operate according to the romantic notion of a connoisseur disc 
jockey sharing his favorite records with the audience. Rather, at nearly all commercial 
radio stations there is a division of labor between the disc jockey, who plays the records 
and makes patter, and the program director, who chooses which records to play and 
when. The typical program director is a skilled professional who creates a "music 
schedule," which is essentially a script for DJs to follow. At smaller stations the program 
director may also be a disc jockey or the general manager, but at large stations it is a 
distinct position. It is also common for a program director to program two or more radio 
  3stations owned by the same chain. To create the schedule, the program director uses trade 
magazines, other radio stations' playlists, airplay and sales charts, systematic audience 
telephone surveys, audience phone calls and letters, information from record companies 
and their promoters, and the database software, Selector. Intuition and taste play some 
role, but it is a highly technical profession (Lynch and Gillespie 1998). Chain-owned 
radio stations are especially likely to employ this technical, research-driven method 
(Ahlkvist 2001), which has the consequence of promoting homogeneity in their playlists 
(Ahlkvist and Fisher 2000). This production of culture literature on the bureaucratic 
nature of large radio chains provides a counter hypothesis to that provided by political 
economy: 
 
H1A: Large chains will reduce Dixie Chicks airplay more slowly than independent 
stations and small chains. 
 
The political economists Herman and Chomsky (1988) list “flak” from social 
movements and other aggrieved parties as a major source of media distortion, but their 
tradition largely abstains from systematic study of where flak comes from and what effect 
it has. Some media scholars have described the role of social movements in shaping the 
media, and the political sociology of social movements provides a useful framework for 
studying the phenomenon. 
Social movement organizations actively seek to influence the mass media and some, 
such as the American Family Association and Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting, have 
this as their sole purpose (Montgomery 1989; Suman and Rossman 2000). Alterman 
  4(2003) documents an aggressive effort by various elements of the conservative movement 
to influence the media. They claim to counter liberal bias, but Alterman considers to be 
"working the refs."  
The Dixie Chicks situation has parallels to the Hollywood blacklist, which is 
commonly, but inaccurately, imagined to have been a conspiracy between the studio 
owners and the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). In fact, the 
blacklist is a striking example of the power social movements can exert on the mass 
media. The 1951 Miracle decision put the studios in a very strong legal position from 
which to face Congress, but competition from television and the 1948 Paramount 
decision ending vertical integration put them in a very weak economic position from 
which to face a boycott.  
Contemporary leftist accounts of the blacklist did not claim that the moguls acted 
from class interest, personal animus for Communists, or even fear of unfavorable 
legislation. Rather the leftist critique of the studios was that they were too "cowardly" to 
stand up to American Legion pickets (Anonymous 1952). Management and the unions 
together formed the Motion Picture Industry Council (MPIC) to fight the blacklist, 
although MPIC eventually adopted a strategy of appeasement. The blacklist and the 
related "clearance" system were effectively run by the American Legion and other right-
wing social movement organizations that published lists of those who had been named by 
informers or were tied to front organizations (Navasky 1980). The Legion promised to 
mobilize their four million members and auxiliaries to picket any film involving these 
suspected Communists. Likewise, once exposed as a Communist, folk singer Pete Seeger 
was "banned from many mainstream venues either because there were outspoken anti-
  5Communists to oppose him or because venues wished to avoid potential controversy" 
(Bromberg and Fine 2002, p. 1144). 
Even if social movement organizations have no proximate involvement in a political 
event, they can have an indirect effect through socializing their members to address a 
certain set of concerns with a certain repertoire of political tactics (Tilly 1983). 
Therefore, a collection of proximately spontaneous acts can be considered a form of 
collective action and part of a social movement. Movements have taught their members 
that boycotts are an appropriate response to offensive cultural content (Montgomery 
1989; Suman and Rossman 2000). This tactic is so practiced that it no longer necessarily 
requires central coordination.  
Gamson (1992) found that in small-group discussions of political issues, Americans 
almost reflexively invoke the potential for grass-roots political action, particularly if they 
view themselves, or those with whom they sympathize, as having suffered an injustice. 
The links among public opinion, social movements, and spontaneous political action 
motivate my second major hypothesis: 
 
H2: Stations in states and regions with conservative politics more greatly reduced Dixie 
Chicks airplay than stations in liberal areas. 
 
Disagreement and distaste need not necessarily lead to protest. Even if one is 
offended by speech, a commitment to political tolerance may allow one to let the offense 
pass without censure. Evidence from survey experiments (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 
1997), ethnographic interviews (Chong 1993), and focus groups (Gamson 1992) shows 
  6that framing issues in terms of free speech makes people more willing to tolerate 
offensive speech. This should translate to the macro level in that areas where free speech 
is a popular value may see it invoked more often in cultural conflicts and have it resonate 
more when it is. 
 
H2A: Expressed tolerance for critical speech suppresses the negative impact of 
conservative politics on Dixie Chicks airplay. 
 
The final literature to which I turn is the sociology of culture literature on country 
music. The form originated with the folk music of Anglo-Saxons, Celts, and African-
Americans in the American South (Peterson 1997). In the 1920s a burgeoning 
commercial recording and broadcasting industry sought out new music beyond New 
York to feed a ravenous and diverse market. Anthropologists such as Alan Lomax and 
Tin Pan Alley A & R men such as Ralph Peer recorded "hillbilly" and "race" records, and 
in the process split a fairly integrated roots music tradition into genres that would 
eventually become white "country" music and black "blues." In the mid 1920s Henry 
Ford sponsored "old timey" musicians, such as Fiddlin' John Carson as a way to promote 
a wholesome nationalism grounded in pastoralism and the identity of old white ethnic 
stocks. This music stood in contrast to the commercial jazz music of Tin Pan Alley, 
which was associated with blacks, Jews, sex, alcohol, and big cities. Beginning in the 
1930s, the Communist Party used folk music in meetings and labor organizing (Denisoff 
1969). In 1953, Senator McCarthy attacked the Communist folk group, The Weavers, 
splitting the genre further — not by race but by politics (Peterson 1997, p. 199). 
  7Thenceforth, "folk" music was identified with the political left (Denisoff 1969), whereas 
"country" music was aligned with the political right (DiMaggio, Peterson, and Esco 1972; 
Lund 1972). By the 1970s country music had spread from a rural white audience to the 
urban, white working class (Peterson and DiMaggio 1975). Ironically, as country reached 
a more urban audience, began to use electric instruments, and integrated into the 
commercial music industry, lyrics "loaded up on signifiers that unambiguously locate the 
song – and by inference the singer – squarely within the country music tradition" 
(Peterson 1997, p. 227-8). As its various historical names ("hillbilly," "country," 
"country-western," "folk," and "old timey") imply, country music has always been 
associated with pastoral white America and its values, such as independence, patriotism, 
and religion. 
Like country music, the related concepts of "Texas" and "cowboy" have strong 
connotations. Shively (1992) found that uneducated, rural, white and Indian men adore 
Western movies and consider "cowboy" a high compliment. This perspective is not 
universally shared; "cowboy" is a favorite epithet of the left, both in America and abroad. 
Many caricatures of George W. Bush show him wearing a cowboy hat. (Indeed the 
popular cartoon strip Doonesbury has long portrayed the President as nothing but a hat.) 
Around the world anti-war protests not infrequently feature posters and t-shirts with 
variations on the slogan, "Bomb Texas" (Hanson 2003; Powell 2003). In Vienna 
protestors used an effigy of Bush dressed in a cowboy outfit. To the protestors and 
cartoonists, a "cowboy" is a self-righteous, violent rustic, and "Texas" represents the 
same, as well as the oil industry and, in other contexts, capital punishment.  
  8Conservatives invert this caricature by embracing the image of the cowboy 
(Engeman 2003). For instance, they frequently use the 1952 western film, High Noon, as 
a metaphor for current events, with the cowardly townspeople representing the Europeans 
and the town marshal -- who alone has the strength of character to fight the bandits -- as 
the Americans and British (Woolsey 2002). This is merely a colorful metaphor for the 
neoconservatives' general principle that a Hobbesian world can only be faced by a strong 
and hard-headed Anglo-American alliance, with most of Europe being too weak and 
naïve to defend the West from barbarism (Kagan 2002). Thus one can see that the 
iconography of "cowboys" and "Texas" resonates with both sides of the debate as to 
whether world problems are best resolved by a forceful hegemon or through a balance of 
power and negotiations in international institutions — a debate that is at the core of the 
dispute over the second Gulf War. 
The ideological connotations of country music and its related iconography provide 
my final hypothesis: 
 





The primary dataset is composed of all country and adult contemporary playlists 
posted to Radio and Records' website for the week ending March 22, 2002 – the first full 
week after the Maines' remarks –. Radio and Records is the premiere trade magazine for 
  9the radio industry and largely consists of airplay charts and other data tables. The print 
edition used to publish playlists, but now these are only found on the website. These lists 
report what songs were played by specific stations in several different "formats," or 
music genres.
2 
For each of the 224 country and 136 adult contemporary (AC) playlists, I measured 
how often the appropriate Dixie Chicks single was played during the week March 16 
through March 22. Although Ms. Maines made her controversial remark about the 
President on March 10, this was not reported by any major American news organization 
until March 13, and few newspapers took note until March 15. Therefore the week ending 
on March 22 captures the initial reaction to her remark and shows a considerable drop in 
airplay. Comparing the two weeks will, if anything, underestimate the consequent drop in 
airplay, since for half of the earlier week, rumors had been circulating at a low level, and 
as the first two AP stories tell, some stations had already received phone calls.  
In the previous week the Dixie Chicks had two singles on the charts from their 
quintuple-platinum album, Home. "Landslide," written by Stevie Nicks about her father's 
death, is largely played on adult contemporary (soft rock) stations. Country stations play 
"Travelin' Soldier," which tells the story of a young girl's love letters to and from a 
soldier who ultimately dies in Vietnam. Both songs are ballads about heartbreak that were 
written by other songwriters. Aside from being on different charts and "Landslide" being 
released first, the principle difference between the two songs is that the lyrics of 
"Travelin' Soldier" deal with military themes whereas "Landslide" is more abstract. 
Neither song is overtly critical of the United States. 
  10I am interested in the change in airplay of the Dixie Chicks' songs. For comparison, 
the playlists show how often each currently played song was played in the previous week. 
Unfortunately the website is not archived, so if a station did not play "Landslide" or 
"Travelin' Soldier" at all from March 16 to March 22, then I do not observe how much, or 
even if, that station played the song from March 9 to March 15. However, in the latter 
week "Landslide" was number one on the adult contemporary chart, and "Travelin' 
Soldier" was number nine on the country chart. Checking against data from subsequent 
weeks shows that such pre-eminence ensures that nearly all stations will play a given 
song. To further test the validity of this assumption, I randomly drew a subsample of 
twenty-five AC and twenty-five country stations that did not play the Dixie Chicks 
March 16 through March 22. By email or telephone I asked their program directors 
(when available, and other personnel otherwise) if they had been playing the Dixie 
Chicks in early March, before the controversy. Thirty-four out of thirty-six respondents 
acknowledged that they had. One even told me "[t]hey had a top charting record. I 
anticipate all country stations were playing the Chicks at or near the top of their 
playlists." Therefore, the most reasonable operational assumption is to impute that 
stations unobserved for the earlier week were in fact playing the Dixie Chicks. 
I summarize this change in airplay with airplay ratio: the number of plays in the 
week after the comment divided by the number of plays in the week of the comment. For 
my dependent variable, I log this ratio, first adding a small constant to allow values of 
zero to be transformed. A high score indicates that the Dixie Chicks were kept on at 
about the same rate as before Maines' comment. A low score indicates that they either 










where  r = logged airplay ratio 
  a = airplay 3/16 - 3/22/03 
  b = airplay 3/9 – 3/15/03, imputed as positive value if unobserved 
 
Table 1. Summary of Variables      
Variable Source 
Unit of 
Measurement  Range 
Logged Airplay Ratio  Radio and Records  Station  [-8.2, 0.15] 
Owner  Radio and Records  Station  9 Categories 
Country vs. AC Format  Radio and Records  Station  Binary 
% of Population in Military  Statistical Abstract of US 2002 State  [0, 1.1] 
% of 2000 Vote for Bush  Statistical Abstract of US 2002 State  [38.4, 60.3] 
% Favoring War in Iraq  ABC News Polls 8/02, 9/02  Census Division  [22.2, 45.2] 
% Favoring Free Speech for Communists  GSS 2000  Census Division  [55.8, 77.8] 
Free Speech * Bush Vote Interaction Term Abstract  and  GSS  State [5.9,  51.1] 
 
My independent variables fall into two categories: ownership and local political 
climate. To code ownership, I create a dummy set with flags for all eight chains that own 
at least five stations in the sample or subsample. The omitted category consists of small 
chains and independent stations.  
I measure the local political climate through two variables at the state level and two 
variables at the regional level. For those radio stations in markets defined by Arbitron as 
being evenly split between two states, I averaged the two states' traits, weighted by their 
population sizes. The first variable is the percentage of the state's 2000 popular vote 
going to George W. Bush (US Census Bureau 2002). This is a fine-grained measure of 
support for Bush among the state's politically active population, which is relevant 
because Maines not only denigrated the war but also insulted him personally. Aside from 
measuring the President's popularity, many pundits hold that this variable correlates with 
  12a fundamental cultural divide between "red" (Republican) and "blue" (Democrat) 
America (Brooks 2001). The second state-level measure is the percentage of the state 
population composed of active-duty military personnel (US Census Bureau 2002). This 
figure proxies not only the servicemen and women themselves, but their relatives and 
those who depend economically on local military bases. All three groups could be 
expected to be especially supportive of troops in the field and defensive of policies that 
put them there. 
To measure public opinion towards the war per se, I pool two consecutive ABC 
News polls from August and September of 2002, with a joint sample size of 1,264 (ABC 
News 2002a; ABC News 2002b). Both polls asked, "Would you favor or oppose having 
U.S. forces take military action against Iraq to force Saddam Hussein from power?" I 
measure this variable at the level of the 9-category census division and attach it to each 
radio station within the appropriate division.
3 
Because the notions of free speech and tolerance for dissent figures prominently in 
popular debate over the Dixie Chicks, I tested the effect of regional levels of tolerance 
using a 2000 General Social Survey question (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2000): "Now, I 
should like to ask you some questions about a man  who admits he is a Communist. 
Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should 
he be allowed to speak, or not?" The GSS question does not directly address the Dixie 
Chicks' situation both because they were not espousing Communism and because they 
are being repressed by private firms, not the state. Nonetheless, the question is a 
reasonable proxy for attitudes towards repression of this kind. First, pacifism and 
disrespect for a Republican president, like Communism, are disliked by the right. Second, 
  13although in principle it is completely consistent to oppose state repression of non-violent 
political deviants while simultaneously favoring private boycotts against them, many 
people, both for and against private punishment of speech, lump it in with state repression 
under the rubric "censorship." Like the ABC data, I measure tolerance at the census 
division level. Since tolerance should not have an effect in and of itself, but rather should 
suppress the effects of conservative politics, I specify both tolerance itself and the 
interaction of the region's tolerance with the state's vote for Bush. So that it will be on the 
same zero to one hundred scale as the other opinion variables, I divide the interaction 
term by one hundred. The interaction is meaningful since at the state level, tolerance for 




The analyses consist of OLS regressions of logged airplay ratio for stations on 
ownership, format, and local political climate. I specified the model in numerous 
different ways: OLS of the logged variable with several different constants, OLS of the 
un-transformed variable, Heckman regression, and logistic regression of zero plays 
versus else. In each case the results were similar. These alternative specifications are 
available on request. I model the equation for country stations only, adult contemporary 
stations only, and all stations pooled together. 
r = α + βω1…k + βγ + βφ + e 
Where: r = logged airplay ratio 
  ω1…k = dummy variable set for chains 1 through k 
  γ = Format 
  φ = local political climate 
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Table 2. OLS Regression of Logged Airplay Ratio                
                      
          Sub-sample        
     All Stations   Country   A/C         
 R
2 0.329  0.272  0.201      
 MSE  3.025  3.177  2.628      
 N  360  224  136      
                 
     b   b   b         
     (s.e.)   (s.e.)   (s.e.)         
Ownership Dummies
a              
 Brill  -0.76   --   --     
   (1.39)            
                 
 Citadel  1.36*  2.20**  -0.22      
   (0.62)  (0.83)  (0.87)      
                 
 Clear Channel  2.28*** 2.78***  1.13  *    
   (0.39)  (0.51)  (0.56)      
                 
 Cox  0.04  -0.39   --      
   (1.19)  (1.49)        
                 
 Cumulus  0.11  0.39   --      
   (0.81)  (0.95)        
                 
 Entercom  1.41   --  0.94      
   (1.00)      (1.07)      
                 
 Infinity  0.85  1.87*  -0.62      
   (0.59)  (0.80)  (0.79)      
                 
 Regent  -0.09   --  -0.48      
   (1.07)      (1.25)      
                 
Format: Adult Contemporary
a  2.46***  --   --     
   (0.34)            
                 
Local Politics              
 % of Population in Military  -0.82*  -0.95†  -0.71 †    
   (0.34)  (0.51)  (0.42)      
                 
 % of 2000 Vote for Bush  -0.73**  -1.09**  -0.41     
   (0.25)  (0.36)  (0.31)      
                 
 % Favoring War in Iraq  -0.10*  -0.13**  -0.01     
   (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.06)      
                 
Tolerance for Dissent              
 % Favoring Free Speech for   -0.46*  -0.77**  -0.14     
 Communists  (0.18)  (0.26)  (0.22)      
                 
 Free Speech * Bush Vote  0.94*  1.46**  0.45     
 Interaction Term  (0.37)  (0.52)  (0.46)      
                 
  15As the results for all three subsamples were largely consistent in direction, I will discuss 
them together. 
The analyses show that most of the major chains either do not differ from 
independent firms or differ in the Dixie Chicks' favor. Directly contrary to Krugman's 
(2003) accusation and hypothesis 1, Clear Channel is actually the chain that most 
maintained the Chicks' airplay. This may be because in addition to its radio interests, 
Clear Channel is a major concert promoter and is promoting the Dixie Chicks' pending 
American tour. So whatever it does, Clear Channel faces a conflict of interest — whether 
it skews its playlists to buy political favors or does so to cross-promote its concert 
interests. In this case it appears that direct financial interest won decisively over 
enforcing hegemony.  
Krueger (2002), however, found no relationship between the firm's concert and radio 
interests, so one should be cautious about assuming conflict-of-interest effects. Note that 
Infinity and Citadel country stations were also relatively forgiving of the Dixie Chicks. In 
general, the dummy set follows a trend that the larger the chain, the more it retains the 
Dixie Chicks on its stations' playlists. This is confirmed by replacing the dummy set with 
the log number of sister stations (Broadcasting and Cable 2001), which maintains the 
pattern, even if one excludes Clear Channel stations from the analysis (results available 
on request). This is congruent with the chains' greater dependence on research, which 
whatever its merits may be less effective at responding to unpredictable shocks (such as a 
scandal) than are less rationalized approaches to programming. Thus, we have tentative 
support for hypothesis 1A as the organizational inertia of large media firms may make it 
  16difficult for them to respond to political crises in the ways that the black-boxed 
assumptions of interest and outcome found in political economy theories would predict. 
Hypothesis 2 is also supported, although the effects are weak for the adult 
contemporary sample: the greater proportion of the state population in military service, 
the greater the decline in Dixie Chicks airplay. But the effect is only marginally 
significant when the sample is split by format. This interpretation is supported by one 
program director who told me that his station's proximity to a military base factored into 
his decision to stop playing the Dixie Chicks. The magnitude of George W. Bush's 
showing in the 2000 presidential election strongly predicts a decline in Dixie Chicks 
airplay on country stations and the pooled sample. The percentage of the region favoring 
war with Iraq strongly predicts a decline, but only for country stations. Although Bush's 
2000 vote is statistically stronger than pro-war sentiment, the latter has a larger 
coefficient but more measurement error, being measured at the regional rather than state 
level and being a sample rather than census. Likewise, the tolerance interaction allows 
the main Bush effect to come through more clearly. Therefore, it may be that support for 
the war actually has a slightly stronger relationship with decline in the Dixie Chicks' 
airplay, but this is concealed by different levels of measurement error and the particulars 
of my interaction specification. 
These variables were all intended to measure the level of disagreement with Maines' 
statement, but disagreement does not automatically yield censure. The interaction of 
tolerance for deviant leftist speech and the state's vote for Bush is large and positive, 
proving hypothesis 2A. This is partially cancelled by a negative effect of tolerance, which 
must be considered net of the interaction term, not by itself. Nonetheless, the overall 
  17impact shows that at the macro level the expression of tolerance for leftist dissent 
translates to the practice of tolerance for it. As with the other public opinion variables, 
adult contemporary results are the same direction but of much less magnitude and 
significance than the country results. 
Adult contemporary stations continued playing the Dixie Chicks at a much greater 
rate than country stations, proving hypothesis 3. This may be, in part, because adult 
contemporary stations have slightly different audiences than country stations. For 
instance, both formats skew female, but country does less so (Arbitron 2002). More 
likely, though, is that listeners find the sentiment "we're ashamed the president of the 
United States is from Texas" conflicts with the values expressed by country music, but 
not those in the less ideologically loaded genre of adult contemporary. It is noteworthy 
that contemporaneously with the Dixie Chicks controversy, the top single on the country 
charts was Darryl Worley's "Have You Forgotten?" Several other staunchly pro-war 
songs graced the country charts, whereas the adult contemporary charts largely avoided 
the issue, except for Fleetwood Mac's anti-war song, "Peacekeeper." 
Not only does the pooled model show that country format stations more greatly 
reduce the Dixie Chicks' airplay than adult contemporary stations, but comparing the two 
separate samples also shows that all public opinion variables have a stronger effect on 
country stations. Mathematically stated, country format not only has a significant 
negative additive effect on airplay, but also a significant negative interaction effect with 
measures of conservative public opinion. This is not a mere artifact of the fact that my 
adult contemporary sub-sample is two-thirds the size of my country sub-sample, since 
mathematically adjusting the standard error of the AC equation's effects to levels 
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results nearly as significant as are the public opinion effects in the country equation. 
Thus, it seems that conservative public opinion affects both formats in similar ways, but 
the ideology of country music magnifies its impact. 
Predicting and exponentiating the results, the three regression equations suggest that 
an independently owned adult contemporary station or a Clear Channel country station in 
liberal Massachusetts would likely maintain the Dixie Chicks' airplay at about the same 
rate as before Maines' comments, perhaps with a slight drop. The same station in 
moderate Florida would cut their airplay severely. In conservative Texas they would be 
dropped from play entirely. If the station had an adult contemporary format and was 
owned by Clear Channel, the prediction does not change for Massachusetts or Texas, but 
the expected cut in Florida becomes less severe. Independently owned country stations 
are predicted to drop or severely cut the Dixie Chicks no matter how liberal the local 
political climate. Of course, the equation explains thirty-three percent of the pooled 




Many fans see country music as an oasis of tradition in a world where tradition is 
besieged by liberal elites. Many country songs "show that it is impossible to 'go home' 
because the old ways are being destroyed everywhere. Often, the federal government is 
seen as the agent of undesired change" (DiMaggio, Peterson, and Esco 1972, p. 47). 
Thus, when country musicians express the same values in the same patronizing tones as 
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No one was especially shocked that Pearl Jam or Madonna opposed the war because 
people expect rock musicians and actors to express liberal sentiment. 
Much of the public was offended by statements against the war by Michael Moore, 
Martin Sheen, or Susan Sarandon. Some institutions, such as the Baseball Hall of Fame, 
the United Way, and the Motion Picture Academy, have sought to distance themselves 
from these anti-war celebrities. However, none of these other celebrities suffered 
anything like the material consequences or vitriol leveled at the Dixie Chicks. 
Comparable numbers of Americans bought the Dixie Chicks' album Home as saw 
Moore's film Bowling for Columbine, but in all probability a majority of the former 
favored war with Iraq, whereas almost certainly most of the latter opposed it. The only 
target of greater rage than the Dixie Chicks for its opposition to the war is France. In part, 
this reflects the fact that France used United Nations Security Council influence for 
several months rather than merely making an offhand remark in a nightclub. But it is 
evident in public discourse that a major source of anti-French sentiment is a sense of 
betrayal that a nation that the United States rescued from German invasion twice in the 
twentieth century has taken sides against it. The Russians are not as unpopular in the 
United States, despite their doing almost as much as the French to prevent the second 
Gulf War. Both country musicians and members of NATO are expected to endorse, or at 
least accept, American foreign policy, and the failure to live up to this expectation, as 
much as the disagreement itself, leads to great anger. 
My analysis has shown no evidence that corporate elites have taken vengeance 
against disloyalty. Boycotts and conflict are a source of instability which business seeks 
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destroy the viability of any of those relatively few acts who resonate with the public as 
powerfully as the Dixie Chicks did until March 2003.  
The data suggests that country music has a vengeful audience to whose wishes 
corporations responded with varying degrees of haste. Thus, the most important 
consequence of my analysis is that it turns the notions of "false consciousness" and 
"hegemony" on their heads. Rather than corporate interests punishing dissent and 
imposing conservative values on the citizenry, in this instance citizens imposed 
conservatism and punitiveness on corporations.  
My findings suggest that, to use Herman and Chomsky's (1988) theoretical 
framework, it is not ownership, but flak that was responsible for the hostile response to 
Maines' insult. In fact, corporate ownership delayed censure. This may be disturbing to 
political economists, who tend to believe that if "corporate control" were only balanced 
by "democracy," then the media would have be purged of any conservative bias. To the 
extent that the vociferous public is to the right, then responsiveness to its voiced demands 
brings media content there as well. 
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2 The Radio and Records website holds considerably more detail than the print edition 
did when it published the same information. It publishes playlists for twelve secular 
English formats, five religious formats, and six Spanish formats. 
3 The Census divisions are New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West 
North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and 
Pacific. 
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